Currently, I am looking for PhD positions, publishing an (academic) piece on moral paradoxes, trying to write more, both on Substack and freelance for other magazines, and working for the Oxford Tradition. I’m based around London, half of the time, and everywhere else for the rest. As always, you can add me on Storygraph to see what I am reading, or on Spotify to see my million playlists.
Konstantin Niewerth
My name is Konstantin. I do philosophical research, write, and teach. In my free time I climb, read, hike, run, and travel for cheap.
In particular, I defend an error theory about all normativity, write literary essays that say everything is fine & life is great, and teach Philosophy, Classics, and Politics. I boulder and deep water solo, walked the length of Scotland, try to avoid running as much as possible, and have hitchhiked Europe and the Middle East with only a hammock.
I hold a Master’s degree in Philosophy from the University of Groningen. My research focuses on moral error theory, in particular whether it generalises to an error theory about all normative propositions and how arguments for and against it overlap with arguments for and against error theories in other domains. I also hold an MPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford, and a BA in Classics from the University of Durham.
Bart Streumer argues for an error theory about all normative judgements, but claims that we cannot believe this error theory, since believing a proposition is incompatible with at the same time believing that there are no normative reasons for believing it. Rather than this being a problem for the error theory, Streumer argues that it makes it more likely to be true by undermining several objections and revisionary alternatives to it and making it harder to reject his arguments. In my paper, I argue that we can distinguish two ways in which the error theory is unbelievable: a thing can be unbelievable in that it is strictly impossible to believe, and/or it can be unbelievable in the sense that it is simply very unintuitive. I argue that the latter sense of the word carries the ways in which Streumer thinks the error theory is strengthened by its unbelievability. My distinction strengthens the error theory’s case by making it resistant to counterarguments resting on revisionary notions of belief, and it means that even if the unbelievability thesis fails, the error theory might still be plausible.
Moral Error Theory and Reference
Error theories across a range of domains share a common structure: claims about a subject matter K essentially ascribe a property P; nothing instantiates P; thus, all K-claims are in error. In debates about error theories of propositional attitudes and responsibility, critics have pointed out that this inference presupposes a substantive account of how the relevant discourse secures reference: unless the property identified in the conceptual claim is genuinely reference-fixing, the failure of that property to exist may motivate revision of the discourse rather than elimination. This paper argues that an analogous “reference problem” has not been explicitly appreciated in discussions of moral error theory. I examine several candidate accounts of reference—meaning-driven descriptivist, theory-driven descriptivist, and causal-historical approaches—and argue that the meaning-driven strategy often relied upon by moral error theorists is difficult to defend. I also consider the possibility that reference is pluralistic or indeterminate, and outline several ways in which error theorists might attempt to avoid the problem. The aim is to show that standard arguments for moral error theory require a more explicit defence of their underlying theory of reference than they have typically received.
How moral paradoxes provide evidence for moral error theory
I argue that moral paradoxes provide evidence for moral error theory. I first examine stronger arguments from paradox that attempt to establish error theory through conceptual incoherence or to establish moral skepticism through the unsafety of moral intuitions, and argue that neither succeeds. I then develop a more modest argument using the law of likelihood: the existence of widespread, robust, and diverse moral paradox is more likely given error theory than given its principal rivals (P(X | ET) > P(X | ¬ET), where X is the existence of widespread, robust, and diverse moral paradox). I argue that error theory predicts such paradoxes because moral concepts evolved to serve local practical functions without being constrained by mind-independent moral facts, making inconsistency more likely when they are systematised and extended beyond their evolutionary domain. I then argue that realism has difficulty explaining the observed pattern of paradox without compromising its account of moral knowledge, while non-cognitivism has difficulty explaining why the paradoxes constitute persistent and intractable problems rather than merely conflicting attitudes. The argument does not establish error theory conclusively, but shows that moral paradoxes at the very least constitute a source of evidence in its favour.
I teach and tutor in Philosophy, Classics, and Politics, at high school and undergraduate level. I have taught toward specific exams or with an open end, for the sake of learning itself. If you are interested, feel free to contact me at konstantin.niewerth@gmail.com.
